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least an attempt there, whereas in English speaking countries stolid indifference has on the whole seemed to prevail.

Yet, apart from its importance for the linguistic study of English and for the history of the drama in Germany, Dutch literature has a good many things of intrinsic value to offer its serious students. There are its mystics like Ruusbroec, inspirer of Maeterlinck, its lovely Beatrys, its Elckerlyc, its song-books, its Vondel and many figures of minor interest.

There is reason then to welcome the appearance of this book. Many a student who would hesitate to tackle Van Helten, Stoett and even Franck, should feel emboldened by it to enlarge his interests, literary as well as linguistic.

A few remarks to finish. In the notes, stating the probable age of the play, is not the word *doubtless* too strong? In the list of editions Penon might have been added. The textual criticism of Matthys De Vries and even the hypercriticism of Lecoutere might have been mentioned. De Vooys might have been referred to and also, as an encouragement to a comparison, the modern Dutch version of Boutens. A word about Maeterlinck's *Soeur Beatrice* would hardly have been amiss. Mr. Fuller's fine rendering, I am glad to notice, receives due recognition.

In the textual notes attention should have been called to the uncommon use of *belet* with *in* (l. 550) and to the defective rhyme in either l. 783 or 784.

One last desideratum: it would have been useful to devote a few lines to versification, giving authorities on the subject.

The volume is very well printed and shows evidence everywhere of most careful preparation. However, with its paper back and rather thick cardboard covers it seems hardly calculated to stand even moderate use.

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THE VILLAIN AS HERO IN ELIZABETHAN TRAGEDY.

By Clarence Valentine Boyer. London, George Routledge and Sons, New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1914. Pp. xii, 264.

This dissertation belongs to a class of "studies" that of late have become more or less popular, in which the appearance of rakes, rascals, and other bad men in "literature" is historically traced, with a wealth of examples arranged in an order that is partly chronological, and partly devised by the compiler. The present investigation gains dignity from its concern with the writings of Machiavelli and Seneca, and with characters in Shakespeare and Marlowe, and from its relation to the *Poetics* of Aristotle.

The table of contents (pp. ix-xii) gives a detailed analysis of the thirteen chapters, of which the first is an Introduction (on the influence of Marlowe, the definitions of hero, villain, and "villain-hero," Aristotle's conception of the hero, "the spirit of the age," and the like) and the other twelve bear the captions, "Seneca," "English Plays before Marlowe," "Machiavelli," "Marlowe and the Machiavellian Villain-Hero," "The Ambitious Villain-Hero," "The Ambitious Villain-Hero . . . the Perfected Type," "The Revengeful Villain-Hero," "Mixed Revenge Type," "Changing Type," "Later Ambitious Villains," and "Macbeth." Four of the Appendices severally treat of *Charlemagne*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *Measure for Measure*, and *Appius and Virginia*; the fifth represents the "Index or Table of Machiavelli's Maxims" from Patericke's translation (?1577) of Gentillet. At the end of the volume there is a Bibliography of three pages, and an Index of fifteen.

Dr. Boyer is heavily indebted, it would seem, to Edward Meyer's *Machiavelli and the Elizabethan Drama*; in referring to authorities on the Senecan influence, he mentions Thorndike first—"Cf. Thorndike, Cunliffe, etc." (p. 13, note); among other sources of his ideas are Moulton, Bradley on *Shakespearean Tragedy*, and Butcher on the *Poetics* of Aristotle. His work reveals a sense of order, some power of combination, and not a little of the perseverance requisite to a progress through many of the plays he has read. In point of historical substance, the study is limited to the Elizabethan drama; but the mainspring of the dissertation is an attempt to examine a statement in Butcher's rendering of Aristotle, by applying it to various English tragedies; as a result, a generalization in the *Poetics* respecting the unfitness of the villain for the place of tragic hero is pronounced to be not altogether valid. The present review will be mainly occupied with this leading thought.

But first, having alluded to the author's qualifications for his task, we may dwell for a moment upon what he chiefly lacks—an adequate knowledge of the classics. Thus, professing to deal with the question of virtue and vice as they are discussed in the *Poetics*, he betrays no acquaintance with the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, both of which must be consulted if one is to understand the Aristotelian theory of conduct and emotion in the drama. Furthermore, he imperfectly comprehends the nature of the *Poetics* itself. Aside from the risk we run in detaching any one utterance therein and scrutinizing it without relation to the whole, we are to remember that the work is not a set of "rules" (cf. p. vi, note), but a mixture of firm generalizations, and casual, sometimes conflicting, suggestions; that it was composed, possibly in the form of a dialogue, for an academic audience; and yet that it primarily was intended for the guidance of poets who might wish to construct, not second-best, but the best conceivable tragedies. Incidentally, Dr. Boyer is too deeply impressed by the article of

Professor Noyes which he cites on page 3; and he follows Butcher on *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, under an impression that this is the last word on the subject. Why did not the advice he received while studying at Princeton include a hint concerning the masterly edition (1909) of the *Poetics* by Ingram Bywater? Even so, he is forced to admit, in a postscript (Preface, p. vi, note) the discovery that Butcher anticipated the main point of the dissertation:

In stating (pp. 2-3) that Aristotle's dictum that the absolute villain was unfit for the part of protagonist had apparently been accepted without objection, I neglected by an oversight to call attention to the fact that S. H. Butcher, in the essay [*sic*] following his translation of Aristotle's *Poetics*, has pointed out . . . the inadequacy of Aristotle's rules when applied to such a tragedy as *Richard III*.

Finally, Dr. Boyer mistakes (by implicitly narrowing it) the range of phenomena that were open to the observation of a Greek critic who wrote sixty or seventy years after the death of Euripides:

Inducing his theory as he [Aristotle] did, however, simply from the Greek tragedies before him, the marvel is that, with the exception of one or two of Shakespeare's plays, his theory should prove to be universally applicable (pp. 94-95).

In point of fact, we know little about Greek tragedy after the time of Euripides,¹ though we may infer from Aristotle himself that Sisyphus and other "villain-heroes" (to borrow the language of the dissertation) were not unpopular subjects in the decline of the serious drama. But the whole number of plays, beginning with the age of Aeschylus, or earlier, and coming down to that of Aristotle, must have been large enough to display a wide variety of themes and treatment. We have it on the authority of Suidas that the tragic poet Choerilus, who began to exhibit in the year 523 B. C., composed no fewer than one hundred and sixty plays;² while Theodectes, born about 375, a pupil of Aristotle, "composed fifty plays with conspicuous success."³ Speaking of the small proportion of Greek literature which has survived, and from which we too readily attempt to characterize the whole, Gilbert Murray writes:⁴

As for tragedy, there must have been, as far as we can calculate, well over nine hundred tragedies produced in Athens; we feel ourselves rich with thirty-three out of that number.

¹ A. E. Haigh draws a melancholy picture of its decline, in *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, pp. 419 ff.

² Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*, Third Edition, 1907, p. 11.

³ Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, pp. 424-425.

⁴ The "Tradition" of Greek Literature in the *Yale Review*, January, 1913 (2.224). Compare what Murray says in the same article (pp. 232-233): "Suppose that as well as Aristotle's defense of slavery we had the writings of his opponents, the philosophers who maintained that slavery was contrary to nature. Suppose that, to compare with Plato's contemptuous references to the Orphics, we had some of that 'crowd of books' which he speaks of. Suppose instead of Philodemus we had all Heraclitus and Empedocles and the early

This is conservative arithmetic, if Aeschylus wrote ninety plays, Sophocles one hundred and twenty-three, and Euripides ninety-two, and if many of the other poets listed by Nauck and Haigh were half as fertile.⁵ A rough estimate of the number of Elizabethan and Jacobean plays (not tragedies alone) might give a figure not greatly in excess of one thousand. But in Greece the range of subjects, as well as the number of plays, was larger than at first sight would appear. "Though the poets began by accepting *any tragic story that came to hand*," says Aristotle,⁶ "*in these days* [that is, in the later Attic drama] *the finest* tragedies are always on the story of some few *houses*, on that of Alcmeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus, or *any others* that may have been involved, as either agents or sufferers, in some deed of horror." I have printed several phrases, including the words "or any others," in italics, so as to shift the emphasis to some of the implications. Even with reference to the best dramatists of his own age, the language of Aristotle is elastic; and one might suggest that the legends of these few and a few other "houses" in mere outline fill something like three hundred pages of condensed narrative in Grote's *History of Greece*. A glance at the first volume of Grote is salutary when one is tempted to think that from first to last the tragic poets had but limited materials to work with.

For certain misconceptions regarding the *Poetics* Dr. Boyer no doubt is less to blame than are various books which the student of English may be urged to read, in lieu of the Greek classics themselves, when he wishes to compare the modern with the ancient drama; and that is why one may bear heavily upon what might appear to be adventitious mistakes in a thesis of this kind. The talk about Aristotle's "rules" dies hard—will it ever wholly cease? And the supposedly narrow range of subjects that were within the reach of the Greek poet, and of the tragedies known to Aristotle, is probably inferred from Butcher or Thorndike. But it is Dr.

Pythagoreans. Suppose we had Antisthenes and the first Cynics, the barefooted denouncers of sin and rejectors of civilization. Suppose that we had great monument of bitter eloquence and scorn of human greatness applied to history, the *Philippica* of Theopompus. Suppose we had the great democracy of the fifth century represented, not by its opponents, but by the philosophers who believed in it—by Protagoras, say, and Thrasymachus. Suppose that we had more of the women writers—Sappho, above all, and Corinna, and Nossis, and Leontion. Suppose we even had more literature like that startling realistic lyric, Grenfell's Alexandrian Erotic fragment, in which the tragedy is, that between a man and a woman *Cypris* has taken the place of *philia*." See also R. W. Livingstone, *The Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us*, p. 16: "Many books about the Greeks have stumbled, and many criticisms on them blundered, because their makers have either tacitly stopped at Aristotle, and omitted developments subsequent to him, or have forgotten that there were movements in Greece which have left no literature behind, or at best only a literature of fragments."

⁵ Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, Appendix I (pp. 463-472).

⁶ Bywater, *Aristotle On the Art of Poetry*, p. 37.

Boyer's own fault, and a serious one, that, whereas there are two cardinal passages in Aristotle on the "villain-hero,"⁷ his study of the *Poetics* has not carried him beyond the first. Is it his misfortune that, even for the single passage which he uses, he has followed the interpretation of Butcher, and has not examined the edition of Bywater? The latter, for our time, is definitive.

The trouble, of which Dr. Boyer is unaware, lies in the meaning of a term that occurs in both passages. In each case Butcher, in deference to the authority of Twining, and not to the facts of experience, misinterprets the word *φιλάνθρωπον*, with which Aristotle describes the feelings evoked in us by the overthrow of an extremely bad man in tragedy. In the first instance, then, we have the translation quoted on page 56 of the dissertation:

For the downfall of the utter villain, although it would doubtless *satisfy the moral sense* [*φιλάνθρωπον ἔχει*], would inspire neither pity nor fear.

In other words, Butcher makes Aristotle say that the effect upon us is *not* akin to the emotions of pity and fear; it touches our sense of justice, since we feel that the bad man in his overthrow obtains what he deserves. We shall shortly turn to Bywater's rendering of both this first passage and the second, where we may find a proper understanding of *φιλάνθρωπον* as "the human feeling in us"—that is, the downfall of the villain may be represented in such a way as to stir our emotions, but not pity and fear as Aristotle defines them.

Meanwhile let us note one or two of Dr. Boyer's own observations, and first what he thinks of gratuitous villainy. On page 58 there is an allusion to the attempt of Marlowe's Barabas to poison his daughter as something "manifestly contrary to human nature"—which is virtually the Aristotelian objection to the use of such an incident. What is contrary to human nature is not "probable" or "typical" in the sense of the *Poetics*. But Dr. Boyer has already defined this kind of hero on page 6:

When a character deliberately opposes moral law from wilfulness, and for the purpose of advancing his own interests, recognizing at the same time the sanction of the law he defies, we call him a "villain."

Such a person, of course, might have redeeming qualities, as, for example, courage. Aristotle, in the first passage, speaks of "an extremely bad man"; he cannot refer to a man so remote from human sympathy that a tender-hearted spectator would have no "human feeling" for him. If pressed, the author of the *Poetics* would, I suppose, be compelled to admit that, as distinguished from "an extremely bad man," the "utter villain" (see Butcher's translation) was bereft of every virtue discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in the matter of vices had those that were farthest removed from the golden mean. Wanting the intermediate virtue of true courage, such a character would be, not rash or fool-

⁷ *Poetics* 13.1452^b36-1453^a8 and 18.1456^a19-25. A third passage, 25.1461^b19-21, is important, but I can make only incidental use of it in this review.

hardy, but a coward. And so on through the list of vices recorded in the *Ethics*; a character utterly remote from virtue (unless some of the vices are incompatible) would be, perhaps, cowardly, intemperate, niggardly, vulgar, mean-minded, ambitionless, spiritless, surly, boastful, boorish, shameless, and spiteful. On the contrary, any one possessed of "autonomy of will" cannot in the Aristotelian scheme be regarded as wholly without virtue.

It appears, however, that such "villain-heroes" as arouse for Dr. Boyer, not the Aristotelian pity and fear, but some kindred emotion or emotions (pp. 92-94) are not without qualities to recommend them. Macbeth, for example, has, not the Aristotelian courage, but something more nearly approaching it than does cowardice.

We are now, I believe, in a position to take up the passage in Aristotle which Dr. Boyer thinks is not in keeping with the successful treatment of the "villain-hero" in a very few out of the many Elizabethan plays where "the type" appears, and to append the passage which he has neglected to consider. I have little more to do than to quote the translation of Bywater and two of his notes, and shall content myself with a few subordinate explanations. The Greek text is presumably accessible to those who may wish to consult it. In Bywater's version *Poetics* 13.1453^a 1-8 reads:

Nor, on the other hand, should an extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into misery. Such a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation.

The passage which Dr. Boyer has neglected, *Poetics* 18.1456^a 19-25, Bywater thus translates:

Yet in their Peripeties [representations of a reversal of fortune], as also in their simple plots, the poets I mean show wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect they desire—a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, like the clever villain (e. g. Sisyphus) deceived, or the brave wrong-doer worsted. This is probable, however, only in Agathon's sense, when he speaks of the probability of even improbabilities coming to pass.

Here, then, alluding to the "villain-hero," Aristotle does recognize the success achieved by some of the later Greek poets in doing what Shakespeare subsequently did with the clever villain and the brave wrong-doer in *Richard III* and *Macbeth*. And he suggests what one feels with respect to the Machiavellian heroes in Elizabethan drama, that, though such characters may occasionally be found in history, (as we have been taught to look for them in the ruling houses of Renaissance Italy), nevertheless they are not typical in human life. Doubtless we are to infer, too, that the relation between character and downfall is not "probable." The more able and courageous, the less likely are the villain and wrong-doer to be deceived and overthrown—only that, according to the paradox of Agathon, people do expect it to happen. But the skilful dramatist, if he might fare better with a more "probable" situation,

may yet, with basic stories of this description, produce an emotional effect in his audience—some such effect as Dr. Boyer says is produced by Macbeth and Richard—but let us not anticipate our conclusion. In order to explain the emotion Aristotle refers to, we may adduce this note of Bywater:

The situation having no *πάθος*, actual or prospective, does not arouse any kind of tragic emotion; it does not appeal to our "philanthropy," or our pity, or our fears. [Such is the spectacle of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity.] It is assumed here that *τὸ φιλόανθρωπον* has some tragic value, but not the same as *τὸ ἐλεεινόν* or *τὸ φοβερόν*. *τὸ φιλόανθρωπον* is that which appeals to the *φιλόανθρωποι*. The *φιλόανθρωπος*, or tender-hearted man, is able to feel a certain commiseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of *τὸ φιλόανθρωπον* accords with the use of the term in the context, . . . as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of *φιλόανθρωπία*. . . A certain affinity between *φιλόανθρωπία* and pity is recognized in *Rhet.* 2.13.1390¹⁹. . . A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as *φιλόανθρωπον* is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what *φιλόανθρωπία* meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of *τὸ φιλόανθρωπον* in Aristotle.⁸

Such is Bywater's comment on the first of the two passages; in a note on the second he recurs to the same point:

Aristotle's theory is that the tragic situation should be *ἐλεεινόν* [pitiful]—which implies that the sufferer does not deserve his misfortunes; . . . he incidentally admits, however, that it may be only *φιλόανθρωπον*, . . . as it is, for instance, when the sufferings of the wicked are put before us in such a way as to arouse a certain commiseration or human feeling for the sufferers. The later Tragedy would seem to have affected this inferior form of tragic motive.⁹

Dr. Boyer has set up a man of straw that he calls "Aristotle," and has laid him low—in vain. Far from disagreeing with the *Poetics*, his interesting analysis of the emotions aroused by the villains in Shakespeare and Marlowe tends in the main to illustrate the inferences of the Greek critic, and on the whole to substantiate the correctness of Bywater's interpretation. For example, on page 52 he says of Marlowe's Barabas:

The hero commences his tragic career out of hatred and revenge, pursues his plot by guile, but oversteps all bounds of justice and reason in the cruelty of his deeds, and is finally taken in his own toils and destroyed.

That the fall of such a man should fail to stir in us either pity or fear is to be expected; but that a man in whom are to be found the above characteristics, calculated to produce only hatred, should at any stage of his career touch our sympathy, nay, more, rouse a wondering admiration, as Barabas does, is a matter for serious consideration. The explanation lies in the fact that Barabas is not *simply* evil; along with the evil he has elements of greatness in his character, such as courage, intellect, and marked ability.

Again, we learn on page 84 that before the murder of the children Shakespeare's Richard "has our sympathy just as Barabas has—not the sympathy of pity, unless it be for his physical deformity,

⁸ Bywater, p. 214.

⁹ Bywater, p. 254.

but sympathetic understanding"; for (p. 85) "Richard, like Barabas, not only has bad qualities, but admirable qualities, and admirable in the highest degree." Or again (pp. 91-92): "We do not admire the villain in him, but the great talents [that is, Greek "virtues"] which he turns to villainous ends." Or finally (p. 92): "And yet the word pity, because we usually apply the term to the individual, does not adequately express the nature of the emotion aroused by the tragedy of *Richard III*." As for the revulsion which we feel in the presence of gratuitous villainy with no bearing on the progress of the story, Dr. Boyer's language is essentially at one with the position taken in the *Poetics*. If the fag-end of Greek tragedy contained as many instances of badly "motivated" wickedness and horror as Dr. Boyer has collected from the Elizabethan drama outside of Shakespeare, we need not grieve over the Alexandrian criticism that sifted them away into oblivion, and has spared us the necessity of studying them. There is revolting horror enough in Seneca, who clearly reflects, though he doubtless exaggerates, most, or all, of the faults which we find condemned by Aristotle in some of the poets of his day. One need not risk an answer to the question whether the taste of the Athenian audience was ever on quite the same plane as the early Elizabethan with respect to similar faults. But we hope that this dissertation does not altogether represent the taste of our own day in the conclusion (p. 219) that *Macbeth* "fulfils *all* the requisites of great tragedy." "May we not without high treason," asks Dowden, "admit that Shakespeare at times could write in a tumid style?" May we not also admit that the poet here shows wonderful skill in aiming at the kind of effect he desires—a tragic situation that arouses the human feeling in one, where the brave wrong-doer is worsted—but that for the arousing of true pity he chose a better story in *King Lear*, and certainly has shown not inferior skill (one thinks of the fourth act in *Macbeth*) in elaborating it?

I have given this review its special shape partly in order to bring to the attention of students of English the edition of Bywater, for they still cling to the suggestive, but at times artificial and even sophistical work of Butcher. In the preparation for my own rendering of the *Poetics*, I learned that Butcher can be misleading where Bywater is safe and direct. Still, it would not be just to leave the reader with the impression that Dr. Boyer's essay is unworthy of notice. On the contrary, it is a promising study, and in many ways should be recommended to his fellow-laborers in a field so diligently cultivated at the present time as is the Elizabethan drama. For one thing, the author has not been content merely to follow the development of a particular phenomenon without considering the end or purpose of it in relation to some general standard of value. That I may not seem, however, to neglect the more restricted interests involved, let me add one or two minor suggestions.

The origins of the villain in the English drama are not to be looked for in history alone, nor, outside of that, only in the Machiavellian and Senecan tradition. There is, for example, a bond of affinity between the scheming Ancient, Iago, who sets things in motion in *Othello* in order to plume up his will in double knavery, and the scheming slave, derived from Greece, who pulls the strings in Plautus and Terence. Besides this, as my friend Professor Adams reminds me, one must consider the delight of the Elizabethan audience in representations of the Jew and the Turk as such, when both Jew and Turk, if they were to be in character, must be delineated as villains. Finally, we may note that *Richard the Third* is classed with the Histories, and that, as King James traced his descent from Banquo, and as Shakespeare's troupe had been taken under the royal patronage, there was a strong historical interest attaching to the story of *Macbeth* at the time of its composition. These are matters which should not be lost sight of when one is dealing with the tragic catharsis in Shakespeare.¹⁰

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¹⁰ Let me add a few corrections, etc., in a footnote. P. 2: "the conquering-hero type of play"; cf. p. 66: "We find more of the policy idea in the following." P. 5: in the quotation from Butcher, "brought about, not by a vice or depravity," delete "a." P. 17: delete the side-number "905" transferred to this from another book. Pp. 14, 25, the word "psychologized"—in "she is so well psychologized," and the like—is ugly when applied to the delineation of character. P. 25: "next he murders his brother; then his bride; but is finally killed by his own sword flying out of its scabbard and sticking in his side"; compare p. 31: "Very soon afterwards the denunciations [of Machiavelli] commenced and continued until 1559." P. 33, note 2: for "supra" read "See p. 31, note 2." P. 41: *Ego mihi met sum semper proximus*: the line may be "Machiavellian" in tone, but it goes back at least to Roman comedy, and probably was a maxim from Menander;—compare Terence, *Andria* 635 (4.1.11): *heus, proximus sum egomet mihi*. P. 52, note: for "Published Macmillan" read "Published by the Macmillan Company." Pp. 241-245, Appendix E: neither here nor in the Contents (p. xii) is there any indication that the material comes from Patericke; we learn the source incidentally in a footnote on page 34. P. 246: "Butcher, S. H. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*"; for "Arts" read "Art."

REPRESENTATIVE ENGLISH COMEDIES. Edited by C.

M. Gayley. Volume III: The Later Contemporaries of Shakespeare. (Macmillan, \$2 net). 1914.

The practical success of the first volume of Professor Gayley's *Representative English Comedies*, evidenced by the publishers' record of reprintings, should afford lively satisfaction to all interested in the deeper study of English Drama, and ensure the prosperous completion of one of the most ambitious enterprises recently undertaken in this rapidly expanding field. The third volume, dealing with 'the later contemporaries of Shakespeare' and including plays by Dekker, Middleton and Rowley, Fletcher, Massinger,